Redigi v. Capitol Records by U.S. Supreme Court
  
No. 18-1430 
================================================================ 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
REDIGI INC., et al., 
Petitioners,        
v. 
CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC, et al., 
Respondents.        
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari  
To The United States Court Of Appeals  
For The Second Circuit 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF  
AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF OMNIQ 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 JOHN T. MITCHELL 
 Counsel of Record 
 INTERACTION LAW 
 1629 K Street NW  
 Suite 300 
 Washington, DC 20006 
 (202) 415-9213 
 john@interactionlaw.com 
JUNE 11, 2019 Counsel for Amicus Curiae  
  OmniQ 
================================================================ 
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
1 
 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE  
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Although Petitioners, ReDigi, Inc., et al., have con-
sented to the filing of this amicus brief by OmniQ, Re-
spondent, Capitol Records, Inc., has not. OmniQ 
therefore moves pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
37.2(b), for leave to file this amicus curiae brief in sup-
port of Petitioners in the above captioned matter for 
the following reasons. 
 OmniQ is the assignee of patent-pending inven-
tions that would rival those of ReDigi, and which pro-
vide a technologically different manner of shifting a 
work from one material object to another without re-
production. OmniQ’s method was not before the Dis-
trict Court or the Second Circuit, however, and the 
Second Circuit’s sweeping language threatens to stifle 
the development of OmniQ’s method to the detriment 
of the public. OmniQ believes it would be helpful for 
this Court to understand the broader impact of the 
Second Circuit’s holding, and why its error warrants 
certiorari. 
 OmniQ’s patent-pending inventions were devel-
oped following extensive legal research, and rely on 
case law that was never considered below or in the in-
stant Petition. OmniQ can show that the Second Cir-
cuit ignored the plain meaning of “reproduction,” 
choosing instead a definition that directly conflicts 
with the plain language of the Copyright Act (when 
read as a whole) and the English-language interpreta-
tion of “reproduction” adopted by this Court and by the 
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Supreme Court of Canada (relying, in part, on U.S. case 
law). Also, OmniQ can demonstrate why the Second 
Circuit’s decision usurps the role of Congress by base-
lessly assuming that well-established jurisprudence in 
the United States and Canada with respect to the “an-
alog” transfer of the fixation of a work from one mate-
rial object to another would not carry over to a “digital” 
transfer of the same work from one material object to 
another. That assumption is in direct contravention of 
the Copyright Act’s plain language intended to apply 
to fixation “by any method now known or later devel-
oped,” (§ 101 definition of “copies” and “phonorecords”). 
By holding that established jurisprudence does not ap-
ply to this particular method that was later developed, 
the Second Circuit has, instead, developed a judicial 
“solution” to a problem best left to Congress, if it exists 
at all. 
 OmniQ was established to find a solution to the 
impact digital technology is having on the public ben-
efits from the “first sale doctrine” and Sections 109 and 
202 of the Copyright Act. The partnership includes vet-
erans of the home video rental industry who were see-
ing the number of films available to the public shrink 
dramatically as the motion picture industry shifts 
from rental of physical DVDs (an exercise of the distri-
bution right that is subject to Section 109 and the first 
sale doctrine) to digital delivery of the same work, but 
to a material object (e.g., the customer’s computer) 
owned by the customer, and that is not readily redis-
tributable without parting with the entirety of the 
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hard drive’s library of lawfully made copies of unre-
lated works. 
 Recognizing that a “copy and delete” means of 
transferring a copy from one person to another might 
infringe the reproduction right, the OmniQ invention 
navigates the path set out in the U.S. Copyright Act to 
move the work from one medium to another without 
reproduction. The result preserves the secondary mar-
ket available to owners of lawfully made copies created 
by licensed reproduction to the owner’s material object 
rather than by licensed reproduction to a plastic disc 
shipped by truck to the new owner. 
 THEREFORE, OmniQ hereby requests that this 
Court grant its Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus 
Curiae and that the Court accept the attached pro-
posed brief amicus curiae in support of the position of 
Petitioners, ReDigi, et al. 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 JOHN T. MITCHELL 
 Counsel of Record 
 INTERACTION LAW 
 1629 K Street NW 
 Suite 300 
 Washington, DC 20006 
 (202) 415-9213 
 john@interactionlaw.com 
JUNE 11, 2019 Counsel for Amicus Curiae  
  OmniQ 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 OmniQ is a partnership among video industry vet-
erans to develop a lawful means fulfilling the purpose 
and effect of the “first sale doctrine” and Sections 109 
and 202 of the U.S. Copyright Act by shifting the fixa-
tion of a work from one material object to another with-
out reproduction.1 To that end, three of the partners 
have filed patent applications teaching their method 
(one of which has already been allowed).2 
 These inventions provide a secure way for works 
fixed in one material object to be un-fixed in the origi-
nal material object and re-fixed in a new material ob-
ject, following well established United States case law 
and Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence. The in-
ventions prevent the first sale doctrine from becoming 
a dead letter when lawfully made copies have been dis-
tributed on material objects that are no longer in use,3 
 
 1 Only Petitioners have consented to the filing of this brief. 
Counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in part. 
No person or entity other than Amicus Curiae and its partners 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. The parties were notified ten days prior to the due 
date of this brief of the intention to file. 
 2 Application No. 15/130,832, Digitally Lending Content 
Without Reproduction, has been allowed. Application No. 
15/130,825, Digitally Transferring Content Across Media Without 
Reproduction, is still pending. 
 3 For example, motion pictures fixed on DVDs have been dis-
tributed by the millions, and the owners have a right to privately 
perform them indefinitely, as well as to sell, gift, rent or lend 
them, but DVD technology is quickly being supplanted by new 
delivery methods, such that there are now fewer DVD players and 
reduced ability to acquire or play the DVD. But if the work fixed  
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or when the “distribution” is carried out by a licensed 
reproduction, commonly referred to as a “download,” to 
a material object on which perhaps thousands of other 
works have been fixed, effectively nullifying the pri-
vate and public benefits of the first sale doctrine given 
that the only way to exercise the entitlement in Section 
109 to lend, sell, rent or give away a particular lawfully 
made copy of a movie fixed on a hard drive is to lend, 
sell, rent or give away all of the thousands of other fix-
ations residing on that hard drive. 
 The Second Circuit’s decision brings an end to the 
benefits of the first sale doctrine whenever the lawfully 
made copies and phonorecords are fixed on a single 
material object along with the fixation of hundreds or 
perhaps thousands of other works. By misinterpreting 
the right to “re-produce” a work in copies and 
phonorecords in a manner that applies even when no 
additional copies are created, and by refusing to apply 
longstanding “analog” jurisprudence to the “digital” 
environment, as Congress intended, the decision below 
robs the public of the benefits of digital commerce and 
secondary sales, and puts the brakes on the progress 
of science and the useful arts. 
 Abraham Lincoln could borrow law books when he 
did not have the means to purchase them at the pub-
lisher’s first sale price, requiring only the consent of 
 
in a DVD can be moved to a computer hard drive without repro-
duction, or from one hard drive to another, all of the economic 
value to the copyright owner is preserved along with the public 
benefit of secondary dissemination of the work without the copy-
right owner’s consent. 
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the owner of the books, and not the consent of the 
copyright owner. The lender needed only to pluck indi-
vidual books from his library shelves and lend them to 
Lincoln. In terms of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Con-
stitution, the book owner’s freedom to lend his books to 
Lincoln furthered the interest in wide dissemination of 
creative works of authorship. 
 Technological advances have allowed us to com-
press vast libraries onto a single material object, but 
in the process has made it untenable to exercise this 
important entitlement. No doubt Lincoln could not 
have borrowed those books if the lender was required 
to part with his entire library for the duration of the 
single loan. 
 The outcome of this litigation could have a sub-
stantial impact on the public value of the first sale doc-
trine in advancing the constitutional purpose of the 
Copyright Act. By preventing the development of tech-
nology to safely and securely move a fixation from one 
material object to another without re-producing the 
work in a copy or phonorecord, the decision below crip-
ples the progress of science and the useful arts. The 
entitlement of the owner to redistribute lawfully made 
copies she owns also benefits the person who depends 
upon secondary markets because the price of a new 
pristine copy is out of reach. Although the technologi-
cal advancements at issue here are not, technically, a 
first sale doctrine issue, OmniQ seeks to keep alive the 
benefits of the first sale doctrine by simply moving the 
fixation from one material object to another, without  
 
4 
 
reproduction. The Second Circuit’s ruling could outlaw 
the use of any such technology. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Second Circuit’s holding contributes to a dra-
matic reduction in the availability of previously dis-
tributed and fully paid copies and phonorecords, 
increases the cost of access – or forecloses it altogether 
– for those persons most dependent upon secondary 
markets, such as copies obtained by secondhand sale, 
lending or gifting. 
 To arrive at this devastating result, the Second 
Circuit misconstrued what constitutes a “copy” or 
“phonorecord,” and ignored the plain meaning of the 
word “reproduce” – by judicially eliminating the pref-
ace “re” – such that any fixation counts as a reproduc-
tion regardless whether there was any multiplication 
of copies. It also failed to apply existing jurisprudence 
allowing the transfer of a fixation from one material 
object to another, choosing instead to exempt “digital” 
fixations from established case law, creating sui gene-
ris treatment in the case of digital fixations. 
 In the music industry, members of the public are 
more able to access any music of their choosing, thanks 
to blanket licensing, statutory royalties and compul-
sory licensing. Those avenues do not exist for literary 
or audiovisual works. With respect to the latter, 
wherein lies OmniQ’s expertise, the public has already 
lost access to vast libraries of motion pictures and 
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other audiovisual works, simply because modern tech-
nological solutions like the one at issue here are lack-
ing. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Second Circuit Judicially Altered the 
Plain Meaning of “Reproduce” in the Copy- 
right Act 
 Subject to Sections 107-122, Section 106(1) of the 
Copyright Act grants the author the exclusive right “to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords.” But the Second Circuit in effect substi-
tuted “produce” for “reproduce,” skirting the normal 
English definition of the prefix “re.” That alteration of 
the English language finds no purchase in the Copy-
right Act, where Congress clearly understood “repro-
duce” to mean to make additional copies. Plus, it is 
contrary to this Court’s holding in White Music Pub-
lishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 
A. There is no “reproduction” without 
multiplication of copies 
 This Court addressed this question over a century 
ago in White Music Publishing: “What is meant by a 
copy? We have already referred to the common under-
standing of it as a reproduction or duplication of a 
thing.” 209 U.S. 1, at 17 (emphasis added). “[I]t seems 
evident that Congress has dealt with the tangible 
thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with the 
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Librarian of Congress, and wherever the words are 
used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to the term in 
its ordinary sense of indicating reproduction or dupli-
cation of the original.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 Building upon the requirement that there be some 
additional copies in order to infringe the reproduction 
right, it has become well established that moving the 
fixation of a work from one material object to another 
does not infringe the exclusive right to reproduce the 
work in copies and phonorecords. 
 The seminal United States case is CM Paula Com-
pany v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973), which 
involved chemically lifting the fixation of an image 
from a greeting card, and moving it to a ceramic tile, 
leaving the original material object – the card stock – 
blank. 
The process utilized by defendant that is now 
in question results in the use of the original 
image on a ceramic plaque; such process is not 
a “reproduction or duplication”. 
The Court believes that plaintiff ’s characteri-
zation of the print thus used as a decal is ap-
propriate. Each ceramic plaque sold by 
defendant with a Paula print affixed thereto 
requires the purchase and use of an individ-
ual piece of artwork marketed by the plaintiff. 
For example, should defendant desire to make 
one hundred ceramic plaques using the iden-
tical Paula print, defendant would be required 
to purchase one hundred separate Paula 
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prints. The Court finds that the process here 
in question does not constitute copying. 
Id. at 191. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly 
followed the Logan decision while echoing this Court’s 
definition of “reproduce” in White Music Publishing: 
there can be no reproduction if the fixation is simply 
moved from one material object to another. 
My colleague, Gonthier J., takes the position 
that if the image were transferred from one 
piece of paper to a different piece of paper 
with no other “change”, there is a new “fixa-
tion” and that would be “reproduction”. But in 
what way has the legitimate economic inter-
est of the copyright holder been infringed? 
The process began with a single poster and 
ended with a single poster. The image “fixed” 
in ink is the subject-matter of the intellectual 
property and it was not reproduced. It was 
transferred from one display to another. It is 
difficult to envisage any intellectual content 
let alone intellectual property embodied in the 
piece of blank paper peeled away, or in the 
piece of blank paper substituted for it. When 
Raphaël’s Madonna di Foligno was lifted for 
preservation purposes from its original can-
vas in 1799 under the direction of the chemist 
Berthollet and fixed to a new canvas, the re-
sulting work was considered to be no less an 
original Raphaël. 
Théberge, at 338. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit 
Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC 34 
(Canada), at ¶ 38. 
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The historical scope of the notion of “reproduc-
tion” under the Copyright Act should be kept 
in mind. As one would expect from the very 
word “copyright”, “reproduction” is usually de-
fined as the act of producing additional or new 
copies of the work in any material form. Mul-
tiplication of the copies would be a necessary 
consequence of this physical concept of “repro-
duction”. 
Id. at ¶ 42. Commenting on the U.S. Copyright Act, 
Justice Binnie noted, 
The U.S. legislation expressly incorporates a 
definition of “derivative work,” as happens for 
example when a cartoon character is turned 
into a puppet, or a tragic novel is turned into 
a musical comedy. In such circumstances 
there is, in a sense, a “production” rather than 
a reproduction. However, the examples of 
what might be called derivative works listed 
in s. 3(1)(a) to (e) of our Act are consistent with 
the notion of reproduction because they all 
imply the creation of new copies or manifesta-
tions of the work. In the application of the ink 
transfer method, however, there is no deriva-
tion, reproduction or production of a new and 
original work which incorporates the respond-
ent’s artistic work. 
Even if one were to consider substitution of a 
new substrate to be a “fixation”, the fact re-
mains that the original poster lives on in the 
“re-fixated” poster. There is no multiplication 
and fixation alone is not an infringement of 
the original work. 
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Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. The court below failed to recognize that 
the purpose of the reproduction right is solely to pro-
hibit the replication of the work into additional copies 
without the consent of the copyright owner. 
 
B. Congress understood “reproduction” to 
require multiplication 
 Congress did not grant an exclusive right to “pro-
duce” copies of a work. The copyright only covers re-
production. The definitions contained in § 101 demon-
strate that Congress understood “reproduce” to mean 
an increase in the number of copies of the work rather 
than every fixation of the work in a material object. In 
defining “copies” as the fixation of a work onto a mate-
rial object from which the work could be “perceived, re-
produced or otherwise communicated,” Congress 
added an important caveat that was necessary to avoid 
the untenable result that the distribution right would 
not apply to the material object bearing the first fixa-
tion: “The term ‘copies’ includes the material object . . . 
in which the work is first fixed.”4 That enlargement of 
the reach of “copies” to include the original, un-repro-
duced fixation, would have been unnecessary if the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation were correct. The 
§ 106(1) right to “reproduce” the work in copies and 
phonorecords does not include every fixation of a work 
in a material object; it only includes every fixation that 
 
 4 The definition of “phonorecords” includes that same en-
largement of scope to include the original, un-reproduced, 
phonorecord: “The term ‘phonorecords’ includes the material ob-
ject in which the sounds are first fixed.” 
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results in an increase in the number of copies. Moving 
the fixation from one material object to another is per-
missible. And, although these principles were devel-
oped in the world of “analog fixations,” Congress has 
made clear that “digital fixations” should not be 
treated any differently. 
 
II. Digital Fixations Deserve the Same Treat-
ment as Analog Fixations 
 Over a century ago, this Court made clear that 
courts should not judicially enlarge the scope of the 
Copyright Act to reach new technologies not specifi-
cally addressed by the statute. It determined that alt-
hough it might make sense for Congress to treat 
perforated player piano rolls as copies of the musical 
work, the courts should not simply presume that Con-
gress would have intended the alteration. 
It may be true that the use of these perforated 
rolls, in the absence of statutory protection, 
enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy 
the use of musical compositions for which 
they pay no value. But such considerations 
properly address themselves to the legisla-
tive, and not to the judicial, branch of the gov-
ernment. 
White Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, 
209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In § 101 of the current Act, Con-
gress intended to future-proof copyright protection by 
defining “copies” and “phonorecords” to include mate-
rial objects in which the works are “fixed by any 
method now known or later developed,” and from 
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which the work can be “perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated.” Under this approach, Congress 
intended perforations on paper, grooves in a vinyl rec-
ord, magnetic impulses on tape, and digital impres-
sions on a digital recording medium, to all be treated 
the same as ink on paper. In essence, Congress took the 
same approach as the Supreme Court of Canada took 
when it upheld the principle of “technological neutral-
ity.” 
The Board’s conclusion that a separate, “com-
munication” tariff applies to downloads of  
musical works violates the principle of tech-
nological neutrality. This principle requires 
that the Act apply equally between traditional 
and more technologically advanced media 
forms. There is no practical difference be-
tween buying a durable copy of the work in a 
store, receiving a copy in the mail, or down-
loading an identical copy using the Internet. 
ESA has already paid reproduction royalties 
to the copyright owners for the video games. 
Absent evidence of Parliamentary intent to 
the contrary, we interpret the Act in a way 
that avoids imposing an additional layer of 
protections and fees based solely on the 
method of delivery of the work to the end user. 
To do otherwise would effectively impose a 
gratuitous cost for the use of more efficient, 
Internet-based technologies. The Internet 
should be seen as a technological taxi that de-
livers a durable copy of the same work to the 
end user. The traditional balance in copyright 
between promoting the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works 
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and obtaining a just reward for the creators of 
those works should be preserved in the digital 
environment. 
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 
SCC 34, [2012] S.C.R. 231 at 232. But the Second Cir-
cuit departed from this sound approach, plucking the 
concept of “digital files” out of thin air, and giving them 
sui generis treatment. The Second Circuit’s approach 
of treating the “digital files” as material objects would 
be akin to saying that, in the case of a literary work 
printed on paper, the material object is the ink rather 
than the paper, and in the case of a sound recording on 
a vinyl record, it is the grooves that are the material 
objects, rather than the vinyl disc itself. 
 For example, the Second Circuit refers to “the re-
sale of digital files containing sound recordings,” Pet. 
App. at 3a, whereas § 101 defines “sound recordings” 
as “works that result from the fixation of a series of 
musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the 
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or 
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” Sim-
ilarly, the court below proclaims, “Today, Plaintiffs also 
distribute their music in the form of digital files,” id., 
despite that the § 106(3) distribution right applies only 
to copies and phonorecords, not “digital files.” With re-
spect to whether a “digital file” can or cannot be a 
phonorecord, the Second Circuit observed, “our under-
standing of the technology is limited, as is our ability 
to appreciate the economic implications.” Id. at 14a, 
n.10. Although it purported to “rule more narrowly” 
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because of its limited understanding, id., the reality is 
that its limited ability to understand the technology or 
the economic implications impeded its ability to under-
stand that a “digital file” on its own cannot be a 
phonorecord. At issue is not whether the work was 
fixed by means of a digital file, but whether the work 
was fixed in a material object. “A copy must of neces-
sity consist of some tangible material object upon 
which the work is ‘fixed.’ ” Walker v. University Books, 
Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omit-
ted). 
 This Court should grant certiorari to address the 
Second Circuit’s dramatic departure from the text of 
the Copyright Act and this Court’s long-established ex-
planation that to “copy” requires re-production or du-
plication. 
 
III. 1960 Doesn’t Exist on Netflix 
 For most of our nation’s history, copyrighted works 
have typically been published in discrete copies – ma-
terial objects in which a single work, or a closely re-
lated collection of works – were fixed. The Copyright 
Act’s sharp distinction between the intangible copy-
righted work and the tangible copy of the work (§ 202) 
could be given full effect in commerce, together with 
the “first sale doctrine” and the Copyright Act’s express 
limitation on the distribution right (§ 109), which enti-
tles owners of lawfully made copies to redistribute 
them without the consent of the copyright holder. (Sec-
tions 109 and 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976 were 
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originally codified together in § 41 of the Copyright Act 
of 1909, and in § 27 of the Copyright Act of 1947.) 
 So-called “digital copies” have been around since 
the days of the music CD and DAT (digital audio tape). 
Music CDs have been manufactured commercially in 
the United States since the September 21, 1984, re-
lease of Bruce Springsteen’s Born in the U.S.A., dubbed 
by CBS as “The First CBS Records Compact Disc Made 
in the U.S.A.”5 That same day, The Edison CD Sampler 
was issued from the same plant.6 
 Even back then, The Edison CD Sampler betrayed 
the publisher’s effort to restrict uses that are statuto-
rily placed beyond the copyright owner’s control. The 
front face of the digital copy (or “digital phonorecord,” 
to be precise) carried a legal warning resembling the 
one struck down by the Supreme Court in Bobbs- 
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908): “FOR EDU-
CATIONAL USE ONLY – NOT FOR SALE.” Although 
it is lawful for the owner of the CD to ignore the at-
tempted nullification of § 109 with respect to digital 
copies fixed in discrete material objects (see, e.g., 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th 
Cir. 2011)), the growing preference for copyright hold-
ers to deliver the works digitally as reproductions 
 
 5 Keith Hirsch, The very rare “red” Bruce Springsteen Born 
in The U.S.A. CD, KEITH HIRSCH’S CD RESOURCE, March 14, 
2015, available at http://www.keithhirsch.com/the-very-rare-red-
bruce-springsteen-born-in-the-u-s-a-cd. 
 6 Keith Hirsch, The Edison CD Sampler, KEITH HIRSCH’S CD 
RESOURCE, March 30, 2008, available at http://www.keithhirsch. 
com/the-edison-cd-sampler. 
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“downloaded” to the copy owner’s own hard drive is al-
ready undermining the benefits of the first sale doc-
trine and its codification since 1909. The delivery 
technology itself is being used, intentionally or not, to 
eliminate secondary markets for sales, rentals and 
gifts that millions of Americans depend upon daily, be-
cause they cannot afford the price of a “new” copy. 
 The Second Circuit’s holding is not limited to 
phonorecords of sound recordings. Both the Second 
Circuit’s holding and OmniQ’s patent-pending technol-
ogy would apply to literary works and audiovisual 
works as well. With respect to the latter, the public’s 
access to movies is shrinking dramatically. While there 
may be enough movies available to find something 
worth watching, the breadth of choice in movies was 
many times higher 20 years ago than it is today. 
 In their heyday, neighborhood video stores might 
have carried tens of thousands of titles. Today, rela-
tively few video rental stores remain. See, e.g., Laura 
M. Holson, Scarecrow Video Has Survived This Long. 
Can It Hang On? NEW YORK TIMES, March 18, 2019, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/ 
business/scarecrow-video-seattle.html (“The store in 
Seattle has more than 132,000 titles, many of them not 
available on the internet, or anywhere else.”). Even 
Netflix, which had been a fierce competitor of local 
video retailers with its mail order DVD rentals and 
deep catalog of older movies, has been dramatically 
cutting back on its selections as it shifts its business 
model to streaming movies on demand. As observed by 
Zach Schonfeld, Netflix, Streaming Video And The Slow 
16 
 
Death Of The Classic Film, NEWSWEEK (online), Sept. 
15, 2017, at 6:10 AM, available at http://www.news 
week.com/2017/09/22/netflix-streaming-movies-classics- 
664512.html, “in the vast world of Netflix streaming, 
1960 doesn’t exist.” Schonfeld goes on to note that 1960 
was the year Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho was released, 
along with Billy Wilder’s The Apartment, and Stanley 
Kubrick’s Spartacus: 
There’s one movie from 1961 available to 
watch (the original Parent Trap) and one se-
lection from 1959 (Compulsion), but not a sin-
gle film from 1960. It’s like it never happened. 
There aren’t any movies from 1963 either. Or 
1968, 1955 or 1948. There are no Hitchcock 
films on Netflix. No classics from Sergio Leone 
or François Truffaut. When Debbie Reynolds 
died last Christmas week, grieving fans had 
to turn to Amazon Video for Singin’ in the 
Rain and Susan Slept Here. You could fill a 
large film studies textbook with what’s not 
available on Netflix. 
Id. Of course, Amazon Video has its own limited selec-
tion, and having to subscribe to multiple services just 
to try to cobble together a decent choice is costly to the 
public, whose local video stores did not charge a 
monthly admission fee whether they rented anything 
or not. Schonfeld describes the Netflix selection as 
“abominable,” noting that, at the time he checked on 
the ever-rotating selection of titles (due to short-term 
licensing) on its streaming platform, there were just 
43 movies made before 1970. Only 25 movies from the 
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pre-1950 era were available to the more than 
100,000,000 global subscribers. 
 Stephen Prince, a cinema studies professor at Vir-
ginia Tech, observed, “Now we see the danger inherent 
in this change – an emphasis on mainstream, contem-
porary movies has replaced what had been a broad ar-
chive of world cinema. . . . Convenience biases viewers 
toward mainstream fare and makes films of the past 
or from other cultures less visible.” Id. “My students 
are heavily biased toward what’s new and what can be 
streamed on portable devices,” Prince says. “What isn’t 
available to stream essentially doesn’t exist.” Id. 
Schonfeld paraphrases the Swedish film scholar, Jan 
Olsson, “Streaming rights are expensive, and Netflix 
probably doesn’t think the audience for old films is big 
enough to make it worthwhile.” Id. 
 Librarian (and writer) Rachel Paige King decried 
the shift to a system based on contractual permissions 
rather than the operation law: 
So, as the technology to disseminate all kinds 
of art and information becomes more sophis-
ticated, so too does the means and the motive 
to restrict access. If entertainment industry 
executives are smart (and they are) they’ll 
make sure that streaming video turns out to 
be a whole lot more expensive for consumers 
than home DVD rental. 
Id. And she is right. That is exactly what is happening. 
“The end result,” says Schonfeld, “is a paltry, pathetic 
catalog of older films shackled by copyright law. It’s a 
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strange conundrum: The internet promises a century’s 
worth of multimedia output at your fingertips but 
ruthlessly privileges whatever got released yesterday. 
Some films have been left behind in obsolete format 
hell.” Id. 
 As major streaming services become filmmakers 
in an effort to both compete using “exclusives” and 
avoid the need to pay licensing fees, many films do not 
get a theatrical release open to everyone, or even DVD 
distribution, before being confined to “exclusive” avail-
ability on a single streaming service. “Frankly, this is 
why I’m keeping all my DVDs,” says film critic, Leon-
ard Maltin. “And it’s a pain in the neck, because they 
take up space. But I don’t trust the cloud. And I don’t 
trust the marketplace to maintain titles that are in 
some cases obscure or not terribly commercial.” 
 “There are some movies you basically have to 
break the law to see.” Id. (quoting classic cinema blog-
ger, Nora Fiore). And that is what OmniQ seeks to cor-
rect by finding a technological solution to what will 
otherwise become a broken copyright system. Millions 
upon millions of movies have already been reproduced 
in copies, sold, and lawfully distributed or downloaded, 
and are currently gathering dust in warehouses, base-
ments and living room shelves, or taking up needed 
space on the owner’s hard drive, while the movies that 
had previously been fixed in DVDs or hard drives can-
not be watched on streaming services, or can only be 
seen by paying the “new” price of a download, if avail-
able. 
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 The first sale doctrine is in serious risk of irrele-
vance if the Copyright Act is interpreted such that the 
very technology that enables on-demand reproductions 
(downloads) of works onto the customer’s hard drives 
also allows every copyright holder to require each in-
dividual to purchase the “new” copy. The millions of 
people who depend upon the used, second-hand goods 
are being left out of the promise of Article I, Section 8 
of the U.S. Constitution. 
 Even the motion picture studios that own the  
copyrights understand that there is no substantive dif-
ference, with respect to their reproduction and distri-
bution rights, between digital delivery and physical 
delivery. In 2001, when Congress was grappling with 
the tax consequences of digital delivery, the Motion 
Picture Association of America addressed the question 
of whether the delivery of a movie through e-commerce 
networks (now known as electronic sell-through, or 
EST) should be considered trade in goods or trade in 
services, MPAA’s Vice President for Trade & Federal 
Affairs gave the following example: 
If a consumer were to place a telephone order 
for a DVD of the film “Finding Forrester” and 
have a copy of that DVD delivered to his house 
on a UPS truck, that is a “goods” transaction. 
Likewise, if the same consumer ordering a 
copy of the same DVD on his/her computer 
and had the same content delivered digitally 
and downloaded from his computer to a write-
able DVD – that is still a “goods” transaction. 
The only difference is that a digital network 
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instead of a delivery van provided the trans-
portation from the retailer to the consumer. 
Testimony of Bonnie J.K. Richardson before the House 
Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade and Consumer Protection, May 22, 2001, pre-
pared statement at 12. Notably, Ms. Richardson re-
ferred to the digital delivery as being “of the same 
DVD” rather than “the same work that was on the 
DVD.” She is right. As early as 2001, the movie indus-
try already saw “the DVD” almost like the literary 
world sees “a book”. There is no “book” or “DVD” in the 
Copyright Act. The value of the literary work of author-
ship is in the ability to read it, not in the quality of the 
paper upon which it is printed or whether it is on a 
Kindle reader. Likewise, “a DVD” tells the consumer 
that “the movie” is in digital form on a particular type 
of material object, but for all practical purposes, the 
consumer will get just as much enjoyment from watch-
ing the movie from a DVD inserted into a DVD player 
as watching it from a computer hard drive. In Copy-
right Act terms, the UPS delivery involves reproduc-
tion onto a medium that has not yet been distributed, 
whereas digital delivery over the Internet involves re-
production onto a medium that has already been dis-
tributed to the person receiving the download.7 
 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“[C]opyright law does not forbid an individual from renting 
or selling a copy of a copyrighted work which was lawfully ob-
tained or lawfully manufactured by that individual.” (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(same). 
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 It is error, therefore, to give a restrictive interpre-
tation to the Copyright Act, which undermines the 
freedom of the owner of a lawfully made copy or 
phonorecords to pass it on to someone else less able to 
afford the new copy, and without needing permission 
from the copyright owner to do so. The only certain re-
sult of the below is that the progress of science and the 
useful arts will suffer dramatically. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant 
the instant petition for certiorari. 
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